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The Case for Taxing
Consumption
Murray Weidenbaum
A low-saving, slow-growing economy such
as the United States would benefit greatly from
shifting the national revenue system from
taxing income to taxing consumption. That
change would provide a powerful incentive to
increase the nation's saving and investment
and, hence, economic growth and living standards.
Introduction

Public interest in changing the tax system is
growing much faster than public understanding
of the competing proposals. Democrats and
Republicans, liberals and conservatives, all
have come up with their favorite nominees for
tax cuts - the poor, the middle class, manufacturers, savers, investors, producers of luxury goods, and so forth.
It seems desirable, under these circumstances, to broaden the public debate to go beyond the present inconsistent array of specific
proposals to modify slightly the income tax,
which is the heart of the existing federal revenue system. Let us consider the most basic
change in the government's income structure:
abandon the whole idea of taxing income and
shift to a consumption tax as the primary federal revenue source.
As we will see, taxing consumption instead
of income generates many impacts, mostly desirable. A constant theme among tax reformers
is the need for increased incentive for saving,
capital formation, and economic growth. In
that light, this report examines the pros and
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cons o~ consumpti?n taxation and also analyzes
the maJOr alternative approaches to structuring
a new tax of that type.
The governments of most industrialized nations, especially in the European Community,
use consumption taxes far more than the United
States. While 18 percent of government revenue comes from taxes on consumption in the
United States, the comparable figures are 26
percent for Germany, 29 percent for France,
and 31 percent for the United Kingdom.
The increasingly international nature of business competition requires updating the American tax system to global realities. There are
several basic arguments which economists have
offered over the years for shifting the primary
base of taxation from income to consumption.
It puts the fiscal burden on what people take
from society - the goods and services they
consume - rather than on what they contribute
by working and saving.
Thus, saving is
enc~uraged at the expense of consumption.
Unlike current consumption, saving makes possible investment in future economic growth.
True, problems will arise in setting up a new
tax, just as difficulties are encountered with the
more limited changes that Congress has been
enacting yearly.
There are two major types of consumption
tax~s. One is a value-added tax (VAT), such
as Is customary in Western Europe. The second approach is to change the current income
tax to an expenditure tax by exempting saving.
Unlike selective excise taxes (such as those currently levied on cigarettes and alcohol), a
value-added tax is comprehensive. It is paid by
each enterprise in the chain of production manufacturer, wholesaler, and retailer. Duplication is avoided by taxing only the added
value that the firm contributes to the goods or
services it produces. Essentially, value added
is the difference between a business's sales and
its purchases from other companies.
Let us examine the basic argument for encouraging capital formation by means of tax
reform.
2

Promoting Investment and
Economic Growth

To many citizens, any discussion of capital
formation immediately brings to mind visions
of greedy bankers, wealthy coupon clippers,
and - to use what is to many a pejorative
wo:d- capitalists. Nevertheless, capital plays
a pivotal role in providing the basis for the fu~re stan.dard of living of any society. Capital
Is essential for increasing productivity and thus
providing the basis for rising real incomes.

A rising stock of capital is necessary
for any growing society.

Educators at times find it amusing when
some of their students discover communistoriented economists writing about the necessity
to hold down consumption in the Chinese economy in order to free up the capital resources
needed to invest in the future growth of that
economy. "Why, they are not even a capitalist
society," these students will note· in wonderment.
Then the thought will sink in that a rising
sto~k of capital is necessary for any growing
society - capitalist (that is, private-enterprise
o: market-oriented) or other (socialist, commumst, and so on). It is really a basic matter of
how much we want to eat, drink, and be merry
today, and how much we want to set aside for
tomorrow. Boiled down to its fundamentals
assurmg an adequate flow of saving and investment is little more than demonstrating a proper
concern for the future.
A slow pace of capital formation in the
United States is especially troublesome at a
time of heightened global competition, when
modern, state-of-the-art machinery and equipment are necessary to match foreign firms with
low-wage structures.
0
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Any doubt about the tendency of the U.S.
tax system to be biased in favor of consumption
and against saving can be resolved quickly with
a very simple example. Consider three factory
workers, A, B, and C, each of the same age,
with the same work experience and size of family, and with the same compensation. Mr. A
regularly spends what he earns, no more and
no less. Mrs. B, a saver, deposits a portion of
her paycheck into a savings account each week.
Mr. C not only spends everything he earns but
also borrows to the hilt, having bought as expensive a house as he could obtain financing
for.
It is interesting to compare the differential
tax burden of these three workers. Clearly,
Mrs. B, the saver, will have the highest tax
bill, for she pays taxes on her wages as well as
on the interest that she earns on her savings account. Mr. C winds up with lowest tax bill, as
he receives a tax deduction for the interest he
pays on his large mortgage. Actual practice includes many variations in the tax treatment of
specific financial transactions. Yet, for the average citizen, the existing personal income tax
structure favors consumption over saving. In
addition, many of the government spending
programs - such as welfare and food stamps
- operate with a similar effect.
Let us assume that A, B, and C all get laid
off at the same time and that none of them obtains ' a new job. Mr. C, the big spender, and
Mr. A, the pay-as-you-go man, will quickly be
eligible to receive welfare, food stamps, and related benefits. The last to qualify for federal
assistance will be Mrs. B, the big saver. Unlike the good Lord, the feds do not seem to
help those who help themselves.

Changing the Tax Structure
All this is no justification for returning to
the revenue structure of 1986 and prior years,
although incentives for saving and investment
were greater than they are today. Surely, the
4

elimination of many tax shelters was a definite
plus for the efficiency of the economy, because
so many of them had financed investments in
uneconomical projects whose major purpose
was to generate tax benefits.
Nor is there a need to jump to the conclusion that the investment incentives available
under the tax structure of the early 1980s provided the most cost-effective way of encouraging capital formation. Nevertheless, one important decision for the 1990s is to consider
moving to a tax system that is more favorable
to saving and investment, the keys to economic
growth and rising living standards.

Many analysts believe that it is fairer
to tax people on what they take from society,
rather than on what they contribute
by working and investing.

A fundamental tax change would be to substitute consumption for income as the basis for
computing tax liabilities. A consumption-based
tax has been described by the American Council for Capital Formation as the next frontier in
U.S. tax policy.
Although the subject has only recently
gained public attention, for years economists
have debated the respective merits of income
and consumption as the basis for taxation. The
United States uses consumption taxes to a far
lesser degree than most other developed Western nations. In 1989, the 24 members of the
Organization for Economic Cooperation and
Development obtained an average 34 percent of
their revenue from taxes on consumption. For
the United States, the ratio was 15 percent.
Japan has since increased its dependence on
consumption taxation.
Many analysts believe that it is fairer to tax
people on what they take from society, rather
than on what they contribute by working and
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investing. In the nineteenth century, classical
economist John Stuart Mill made this point in
advocating the exemption of saving as part of a
"just" income tax system.
In the 1940s,
American economist Irving Fisher argued that
the income tax involved double taxation of saving and distorted the choice of individuals in
favor of consumption. Thus, not only is the income tax unjust, but it encourages consumption
and leisure at the expense of thrift and enterprise.
The U.S. Treasury actually proposed a
"spending tax" in 1942 as a temporary wartime
measure to curb inflation. The proposal was
quickly rejected by Congress. A major ar~
ment against such a tax - then and now - Is
that the exemption of saving would favor the
rich, since they are better able to save large
portions of their incomes. Some believe that
this would lead to greater concentrations of
wealth in the hands of a few. Proponents of a
consumption tax respond that it can be made as
steeply progressive as desired. Moreover, the
recent trend in income taxation in the United
States has been away from progressive and toward a flatter, more proportional revenue
structure. The 1981 and 1986 tax statutes are
striking cases in point.
Another objection to the consumption base
is that it would favor the miser over the spendthrift, even when both have similar spending
power or ability to pay. The response offered
to this argument is that consumption uses up
the resources available to the nation, while saving adds to these resources. Thus, people
should be taxed on what they take out of the
society's pool of resources, not on what they
put into it.
Tax experts have devised, and criticized, a
variety of specific consumption-based taxes.
No consensus has yet been reached on the details. It is likely that three interrelated clusters
of issues will receive increased public attention
in the 1990s: (1) the desirability of a tax on
consumption, (2) the specific form that it
should take ("top down" or "bottom up"), and
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(3) whether it should replace or augment an
existing tax.

A Consumption Tax
In practice, much of the impact of shifting
to a consumption tax base would depend on
how the tax was structured. The two major
alternatives are consumption taxes levied on
total purchases (top down) and value-added
taxes collected on individual sales (bottom up).
In theory, the base of the two taxes is the same
(the value of goods and services purchased) and
the yields could be very similar.

The income tax encourages consumption
and leisure at the expense of
thrift and enterprise.

Consumption taxes would be collected much
as income taxes are, levied directly on the taxpayer. The annual taxpayer return would c?ntinue to comprise the heart of the colle~tiOn
system containing exemptions and deductiOns,
as at present. However, ~ne m~jor change
would be instituted: the portion of Income that
is saved would be exempt from taxation.
Figure 1 is a hypothetical example of a
"short form" version of a consumption tax return. It shows how the difficult bookkeeping
requirement to tally all consumption outlays
could be structured. The illustrative tax form
is based on the notion that income equals consumption plus saving. Thus, consumption can
be readily estimated, indirectly but accurately,
merely by deducting saving from income (and
taxpayers are used to developing estimates .of
their incomes). That new schedule would Include changes in bank balances and in holdings
of bonds, stocks, and similar investment assets.
A tax on consumption could be made as
progressive as any income tax by adjusting the
7

Figure 1

Illustrative Consumption
Tax Return
Receipts

Amounts

1. Wages, salaries, tips, etc.

2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.

Dividends
Interest
Rents and royalties
Pensions and annuities
Net receipts of sole proprietorships
Withdrawals from partnerships
Receipts from:
a. sales of financial assets
b. gifts and bequests
c. insurance
9. Net decrease (if any) in
bank accounts
10. Total (add lines 1 through 9)
Saving
11. Purchases of financial assets
12. Capital contributed to partnerships
13. Net increase (if any)
in bank accounts
14. Other investments
15. Total (add lines 11 through 14)
16. Gross Consumption
(subtract line 15 from line 10)
Deductions
17. A. Itemized deductions
or
B. Standard deduction
18. Federal taxes paid during the year
19. Total (add lines 17 and 18)
20. Net Consumption (subtract
line 19 from line 16)
21. Exemptions
22. Taxable Consumption
(subtract line 21 from line 20)
8

rates. Like the income tax, it could be used as
part of fiscal policy to fight inflation or recession. In the longer run, it might generate more
revenue - or permit rate reductions - to the
extent that the added savings stimulate economic growth.
For a while, the United States was moving
toward a consumption tax, albeit indirectly and
in modest steps. The establishment of independent retirement accounts {IRAs) enabled
many federal taxpayers to defer paying taxes on
amounts saved and invested in an IRA (up to
$2,000 a year). Also, the first $100 of dividends per taxpayer was exempt from income
taxation. The 1986 tax law, however, sharply
cut back on IRAs and eliminated the dividend
credit.

A Value-Added Tax
A consumption tax, as shown above, can be
calculated via a "top down" approach, building
on the records that are already available to provide the data needed for the collection of corporate and personal income taxes. In contrast,
a value-added tax (VAT) represents a very different way of collecting a general tax on consumption, focusing on the sales to consumers
by individual companies. In total, a VAT
should be equivalent in yield to a single-stage
sales tax levied at the retail level. It is, in effect, a sophisticated and comprehensive sales
tax which avoids the double counting otherwise
inevitable when the same item moves from
manufacturer to wholesaler to retailer.
Essentially, a firm's value added is the difference between its sales and its purchases from
other firms. As shown in Table 1, value added
can also be estimated by adding labor and capital inputs supplied by the firm itself - represented by wages and salaries, rent and interest
payments, and profit.

Reasons for Favoring a VAT
Proponents of the VAT contend that it is
economically neutral, because ideally it would
9

Advocates of the value-added tax also point
out that, in contrast to an income tax, there is
no penalty for efficiency and no subsidy for
waste. Moreover, the VAT is neutral between
incorporated and unincorporated businesses
and, theoretically, even between public and private enterprises. By focusing on consumptiOn,
it avoids a double tax burden on the returns
from capital. This tax starts off with no exclusions or exemptions and thus, at least initially,
provides a broader and fairer tax base, one that
the underground economy will have more difficulty evading. Consumption taxes such as the
VAT are levied on the returns to labor (wages
and salaries) equally with the returns on capital
(rent, interest, and profits).

Table 1

Two Methods of Computing
Value Added
Raw
Materials
Producer

Item

Manufacturer

Whole
saler

Retailer

Cumulative

Purchases
of inputs

$100

$500

$800

$1,400

Value Added:
$60
Wages
10
Rent
Interest
10
20
Profit

$275
25
50
50

$200
40
25
35

$100
50
25
25

$635
125
110
130

Total Value
Added
$100

$400

$300

$200

$1,000

Sales of
output

$500

$800

$1,000

$2,400

$100

1he VAT has become one of the revenue
workhorses of the world.

Note: Value added can be estimated in two ways:
(1) Deducting purchases from .sales of outp!-lt .
(2) Adding inputs by the firm Itself (excludmg mputs
supplied by others); thus $2,400- $1,400 = $635
$125 + $110+ $130 = $1,000

be levied at a uniform rate on all items of consumption. It does not distort choices among
products or methods of production. Thus,
shifting to a more capital-intensive and perhaps
more profitable method of production does not
influence the tax burden. Many of these
arguments apply with equal force to any
compre-hensive tax on consumption. Nor is
the allocation of resources across product,
market, and industry lines affected by a tax on
value-added. In these regards, the VAT is far
superior to the existing array of selective excise
taxes.
10

+

)
~

J

Another argument in favor of U.S. adoption
of a value-added tax is that so many other nations have adopted this form of revenue. It fits
in better than other taxes with the growing international character of production. The VAT
has become one of the revenue workhorses of
the world. Virtually every important country
in Europe imposes the tax and it has spread
throughout the Third World. The members of
the European Common Market have used VAT
taxation since the late 1960s or early 1970s. In
1989, Japan imposed a broadbased 3 percent
sales tax.
Unlike the situation in the United States, the
adoption of a tax on value added was true reform in Western Europe. Value-added taxes
typically replaced an extremely inefficient form
of consumption tax that was already in place, a
cascading sales or turnover revenue system.
Those latter taxes apply to the total amount of a
firm's sales rather than only to its value added.
Sales taxes, thus, would be paid over and over
again on the same items as they moved from
firm to firm in various stages of the production
11

and distribution process. Such cascade-type
taxes favored integrated firms (who could legally avoid one or more stages of the tax), but
they severely discriminated against independent
companies who operate at only one phase of the
production process. ·
An added, widely cited reason for adopting
a VAT is the anticipated foreign trade benefits.
Unlike an income tax, a sales-based tax can be
imposed on goods entering the country and rebated on items leaving - supposedly encouraging exports and discouraging imports. Thus,
at first blush, a VAT would seem to help reduce this nation's presently large deficit.
However, most economists believe that
fluctuations in exchange rates would largely
offset these initial effects and result in little
change in the balance of trade.

area of sales taxation, traditional! y reserved for
state and local governments. However, states
and some localities, have come to rely on income taxes despite heavy use of the same tax
base by the federal government.
Turning to the administrative aspects, imposition of a value-added tax in the United States
would require establishing a new tax-collection
system by the federal government and new
recordkeeping on the part of taxpayers. The
Treasury Department, based on European experience, believes it would need 18 months after
enactment to begin administering a VAT.

The Treasury Department, based on
European experience, believes it would
need 18 months after enactment to begin
administering a VAT.

Reasons for Opposing a VAT
Opponents of a value-added tax offer an
extensive list of shortcomings. They contend
that a VAT, as in the case of any consumptionbased revenue source, is inherently regressive
-those least able to pay face the highest rates.
That regressivity can be softened by exempting
food and medicine or by refunds to low-income
taxpayers, but such variations make the collection of the tax more complicated. They also
provide opportunity for people in the underground economy to avoid paying taxes.
Because the VAT is included in the price of
purchases, it registers in all of the price indices
and, hence, exerts an inflationary force on the
economy. The counterargument is that this is
only a one-time effect, occurring when the tax
is enacted or increased. However, there would
be secondary effects resulting from the operation of automatic escalators in wage and price
agreements. That inflationary impact could be
offset by appropriate changes in monetary policy, albeit at times with an adverse effect on the
levels of production and employment. Opponents also charge that a VAT would invade the
12

A variety of approaches has been suggested
for collecting the new tax. The simplest is the
credit method (see Table 2). Under this approach, the tax is computed initially on a company's total sales and the firm is given credit
for the VAT paid by its suppliers. To a substantial degree, such a VAT would be selfenforced. Each company would have a powerful incentive to ensure that its suppliers paid
their full share of the tax, because any underpayment would have to be made up by the next
firm in the chain of production and distribution.
In practice, the collection of the VAT may
not be as simple as shown here. That would be
the case if certain transactions were exempted
(such as food) and if nonprofit institutions and
government enterprises were treated different! y
from business firms. Exemptions are no minor
matter in terms of the administrative complexity that they generate. In France, a long and
extensive debate occurred over whether or not
Head and Shoulders anti-dandruff shampoo was
a tax-exempt medicine or a cosmetic subject to
the full VAT.
13

Table 2

Computing the· VAT Using
the Credit Method

Item

Raw
ManuMaterials facturer
Producer

Wholesaler Retailer

Sales of output $100
Less purchases
_Q
Value added $100

$500
100
$400

$800
500
$300

$1,000
800
$200

Tax on total sales $10
Credit on
purchases
-$10
Tax liability

$50

$80

$100

10
$40

50
$30

80
$20

Note: Assumes 10 percent VAT on a consumption basis.

There is a great variation in the VAT rates
within the various countries that use it. In
Western Europe, the standard VAT rate ranges
from 12 percent in Spain to 25 in Ireland, although some luxury items are taxed at higher
rates. However, Spain taxes some items at as
low as 6 percent and Ireland's VAT on occasion is down to 2.4 percent. The United Kingdom has a zero tax on books and food. The
future minimum VAT rate in the European
Community has been set at 15 percent.

Macroeconomic Effects
On the basis of 1990 levels of economic activity, a 5 percent VAT would yield in the
neighborhood of $100 billion in federal revenue
(depending on the coverage of the tax). If the
VAT is considered to be an additional source
of federal revenues, fiscal flows of such magnitude likely would generate a variety of other
impacts on the economy. For example, these
14

estimates of the yield of the VAT assume that
the Federal Reserve will follow an accommodating monetary policy, with a somewhat inflationary effect.
Because the withdrawal of such substantial
amounts of purchasing power would act as a
depressant on the economy, a tax of that
magnitude might be phased in over a period of
time - or offset by reductions in existing income taxes. One econometrics analysis concludes that the economy would grow about 1
percent more slowly for each 1 percent of VAT
levied and that inflation would be 1-112 to 2
percent higher during an initial adjustment
period.
In policy terms, the institution of a new tax
in the 1990s should not be viewed in isolation
but in comparison to likely alternatives:
• Foregoing desirable increases in government programs;
• Increasing income tax rates; or
• Continuing with high levels of deficit financing.
Each of these other approaches to the budget
problem would be accompanied by substantial
burdens or costs, although they would differ
from those generated by the imposition of a
consumption-based tax such as a VAT. Foregoing increases in education, infrastructure,
and research and development might have adverse consequences on the prospects for economic growth. Reversal of the 1980s trend
toward lower marginal income tax rates would
reduce the incentives to work, save, and invest.
Continued high levels of deficit spending would
bring their own set of drawbacks, ranging from
high real interest rates to upward pressure on
the dollar and thus on the foreign trade deficit.

Value-Added Tax as a
Substitute
The substitution of a value-added tax for all
or portions of existing income and payroll taxes
is also a possibility. In the recent past, several
15

proposals have been made to make the VAT a
part of the U.S. tax structure.
In 1980, Representative AI Ullman (DOre.), then Chairman of the House Ways and
Means Committee, introduced a comprehensive
revenue bill. It provided for individual and
corporate income tax rate reductions, liberalized depreciation rules, expanded retirement
savings provisions and reduced Social Security
taxes, all of which were offset by a 10 percent
tax applied to a moderately narrow value-added
base (which excluded food, housing, medical
care, farmers, fishermen, mass transit, interest,
and exports). Ullman's defeat for reelection
soon after dampened the enthusiasm for a VAT
for some time.
In 1985, Senator William Roth (R-Del.)
proposed a variation of the VAT called a Business Transfer Tax (BTT). It would be a way in
which companies could pay for their Social Security tax liabilities. The base for the new tax
would be similar to the earlier Ullman proposal. His bill also called for using the net
revenues of his consumption-style tax (after the
Social Security credit) to reduce individual tax
rates and to provide increased individual saving
incentives. In 1986, Senator Roth outlined explicit income tax rate reductions and investment-related provisions which would be funded
by revenues from an eight percent BTT (after
the Social Security credit) applied to a much
broader base than his earlier proposal.
In 1992, former California Governor Jerry
Brown proposed a 13 percent value-added tax
to accompany the move to a flat income tax at
the same rate.

Conclusions
On balance, it seems that a "top down" consumption tax would achieve most of the benefits intended for a VAT with few of the shortcomings of that "bottom up" type of revenue
measure. Converting the income tax to a consumption tax - unlike adopting a new tax on
value added - does not require setting up an
16

additional collection system. Nor is it regressive or inflationary. Unlike a VAT, transforming the existing income tax does not provide the federal government with a new revenue source; therefore, the public sector is not
likely to grow as rapidly.
In contrast, a value-added tax becomes
complicated if an effort is made to soften its
regressivity by exempting certain categories of
expenditures or taxing them at lower rates
(e.g., food, medicine, education).

Converting the income tax to a
consumption tax - unlike adopting a new
tax on value added - does not require
setting up an additional collection system.

It is not surprising that politicians in many
countries favor sales-type taxation on the assumption that the best tax is a hidden tax. The
fact is that "bottom up" sales taxes such as a
VAT are rarely identified separately, and the
purchaser merely pays a combined product-andtax price. That type of consumption tax thus
finds business firms acting as the middleman
(or woman) between government and the consumer. Many companies marketing consumer
products fear that the higher prices resulting
from imposing a VAT will reduce their sales
and profits. Conversely, companies selling
capital equipment and business services tend to
take a more sympathetic attitude toward this
form of government revenue, which would
lighten the tax burden on their customers and,
hence, tend to expand their markets.
.
Changing the income tax to a comprehensive consumption tax, in contrast, would not be
shielded from the knowledge of the taxpayer
and is not likely to generate such differential
reactions. In any event, the shift in emphasis
in U.S. taxation from income to consumption
should on balance generate positive results, especially in helping to move the economy to a
17

more rapid expansion path and, thus, enable the
American people to enjoy a higher living standard.
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